Part II: 中国纺织服装业2023年：派对结束了，中国需要邀请一个戴明来参加下一个派对 莲花与迈克尔的观点2023年：四个部分的改变者

 II. W. Edwards Deming是谁，他在1950年告诉了日本人什么？

（有关Deming及其遗产发展的更多细节，请观看此视频。）

在第二次世界大战期间，Deming向美军讲授了关于质量控制的战时课程后，他应日本科学家与工程师联合会（JUSE）的邀请，前往日本讲授统计质量控制课程。他的讲座促进了日本有效的基于统计的质量过程体系的发展，也为现在被称为PDCA（计划-执行-检查-行动）的创新框架奠定了基础。

Deming进行了一系列六次讲座，其中包含了许多改变了日本的概念和理解，并且至今仍在遵循的内容。同样是JUSE从1951年开始授予“Deming奖”给杰出的企业。

以下是该系列讲座的一些亮点：

他的开场白：“我们正处于一个由统计原理和技术主导的新工业时代。我将尝试解释这些原理和技术如何帮助日本增加出口贸易。”

非常重要且简单的观点：“质量必须在生产的每个环节中发生。” 这意味着，将质量控制基于最终检验，等到产品已经存在问题且不符合要求后再进行价值增加的环节，是一种浪费时间和金钱的做法。

Deming的著名的14个观点之一是“改善竞争地位”，赋予客户在质量管理和改进中的关键角色。

Deming改变了旧有的“设计-制造-尝试销售”的方式，采用了PDCA的方法：

设计产品（包括适当的测试）。

在生产线和实验室中进行制造和测试。

把产品投放市场。

通过市场调研在服务中测试产品。了解用户对产品的看法，以及为什么非用户没有购买。

根据消费者对质量和价格的反应，重新设计产品。

不断重复以上循环。

我将这个概念称之为“生产可销售的产品，而不是试图销售已经生产的产品”。这也是亚马逊的模式，并对其成功做出了巨大贡献。

以下是Koiesar的文章中的两个图表，对此具有重要意义：

请注意，这里的质量过程是基于过程而不是结果的。这意味着在产品完成并准备好发货之前，已经对材料进行了测试，并在制造过程中的不同阶段进行了测试。因此，最终检验在很大程度上只是一个形式上的步骤。

为什么这样更好？因为问题可以在更多材料和人力投入之前被识别出来，并且可以隔离问题流程或工人。（请注意，绝大多数服装供应商和买家使用的是AQL，这是一个在80％产品准备好发货时进行的基于统计的最终检验过程。）

我尝试在90年代初从中国进口汽车报警器时实施了Deming的控制方式，并且在作为GoldToe Moretz公司采购副总裁时与每家工厂合作时也是如此。这就像试图教一只鸡跳芭蕾舞一样困难。最后，我访问了一家在编织后进行完整检验的印度工厂。袜子的制作过程中，90%的生产集中在编织上，之后只需完成封口、整理和包装。当然！为什么要花费金钱、时间和人力来加工袜子，然后只在整个过程完成后进行检查呢？这就是Deming质量哲学的核心。

接下来是PDCA循环或“设计循环”的图形表示：

这是我之前提到的区别的核心，即制造可销售的产品，而不是销售您能制造的（或已经制造的）产品。

还请注意，这是一个持续循环，所以为了使该过程成功，必须长期致力于这个过程。

那么为什么不是每个人都这样做呢？这么简单并且有很大道理。主要原因是：a. 它需要更多时间，b. 它成本更高，c. 它需要对这个过程有耐心和承诺。大多数工厂（不仅仅是中国的）和买家都不愿意遵循这个过程，或者管理层不会推动它，而是选择随意尝试并发货。

Deming在1950年的第一次讲座中指出，应该“将供应商融入到生产系统中，并共同对其质量负责，而不是将他们视为外部人员和对立者。” 这是一个重大问题，不仅局限于中国，而且是买家普遍存在的一种态度，他们把“工厂”看作是一种非生命的物体。

当工厂生产出品质无可争议、无可指责的产品，并且不为了订单而妥协时，这种态度才会停止。

Deming的系统逻辑而且有效，因此他仍然被研究。那些从未听说过Deming，只听过“统计质量控制”和“全面质量管理”这些词，却对Deming本人和他的原则一无所知的人会错误地将其误解为一种依赖于统计数据的方法论；这是非常错误的。是的，Deming相信统计在质量和改进管理中起着重要作用，但他决不是数字的盲目追随者；相反，他强调“控制图不能替代大脑”，并且“在制造厂进行质量控制时，结合接受抽样是最好的保护措施。检查很多并只挑选最好的产品是不经济的。”

我有幸在20世纪70年代中期在纽约大学斯特恩商学院（NYU Stern）上过Deming的一门课。尽管现在我后悔没有更多地吸收他的言论，但我清楚地记得他的教学和他的信息之所以引人注目，是因为你实际上并不需要记笔记，因为他的教学都是那么通俗易懂。

日本制造商吸收并融入Deming的教训的结果就是历史。今天，日本产品不再代表廉价产品，在许多领域都有资格竞争“世界最佳”的称号。材料和制造产品无疑是优秀的，并且能够取得较高的价格。顾客愿意为质量付费，这增加了产品的价值，并且对提供质量的品牌充满热忱。我可以根据自己的经验列出一份清单，但我相信你知道我的意思。

对于中国是否也是如此？它是否应该如此？它能否如此？如果应该并且能够，为了使其成功，需要进行哪些改变？

Part II- China textile and apparel 2023: The Party’s Over and China needs to invite a Deming to the next party

 II. Who is W. Edwards Deming and what did he tell the Japanese in 1950?

(For more details about Deming and the development of his legacy, watch the video here.

After teaching wartime courses to US forces on quality control during WWII, Deming was invited to lecture on Statistical Quality Control in Japan by the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE). His lectures gave rise to development of effective statistically-based quality process systems in Japan and the framework for innovation now known as PDCA (Plan- Do- Check- Act).

Deming gave a six-part lecture series which contains many of the concepts and understandings that changed Japan and are still followed today. The same JUSE started awarding a “Deming Prize” to the outstanding firms in 1951.

Here are some highlights of the series:

 His opening- "We are in a new industrial age created largely by statistical principles and techniques. I shall try to explain how these principles and techniques are helping Japan to increase her export trade.” 

Super important and super simple: “Quality had to happen at all stages in the "chain

of production.””  This means, quite simply, that basing quality control on final inspections after the damage has already been done and value added to an unacceptable product is a waste of time and money.

What later became part of Deming’s famous 14 points was “improved competition position,” giving the customer a key role in quality management and improvement. 

Deming changed the old way of Design it-Make It-Try to sell it to what is known as PDCA:

1. Design the product (with appropriate tests).

2. Make it, test it in the production line and in the laboratory.

3. Put it on the market

4. Test it in service through market research. Find out what the user thinks of it, and why the nonuser has not bought it.

5. Redesign the product, in light of consumer reactions to quality and price.

6. Continue around and around the cycle.

I would refer to this concept as “make what you can sell, don’t try to sell what you make.” This has been and is Amazon’s paradigm and is a big contributor to their success.

Two illustrations from Koiesar’s article are material here:

  

Note that the quality process here is process-based not result-based. What this means is that by the time the product is finished and ready for shipping, it has already been tested- materials, and at various times during the manufacturing process. So final inspection is, for the most part, a formality.

Why is this better? Because problems can be identified before more material and labor is put into them, and problem processes or workers isolated. (Note that the overwhelming majority of apparel suppliers and buyers use AQL, which is a statistically-based FINAL inspection process that takes place when 80% of the product is ready for shipment).

I tried to implement Deming’s style of control when I was importing car alarms from China in the early 90’s, and in every factory that I worked with as the VP of Sourcing for GoldToe Moretz, a socks company. It was like trying to teach a chicken to dance ballet. Finally, I visited one factory in India that was conducting a full inspection after knitting. The way socks are made, 90% of the production is focused on knitting; all there is after that is closing the toe, boarding (shaping) and packing. Of course! Why spend money, time and labor to process the sock and only inspect after the entire process is finished? This is the essence of Deming’s quality philosophy.

Next is graphic representation of the PDCA cycle or “Design Cycle”:

This is the essence of the difference I mentioned before, making what you can sell as opposed to selling what you can make (or have made).

Also note that this is a continuous loop, so for this process to be successful, it must be something that is committed to for the long term.

So why doesn’t everyone do this? It’s so simple and makes great sense. The main reasons are because a. it takes more time, b. it costs more, and c. It requires patience and commitment to this process. Most factories, not just in China, and buyers are not willing to follow this process, or management won’t facilitate it, opting for throwing shit against the wall and shipping what sticks.

Deming’s first lecture in 1950 stated that there should be: “The integration of the suppliers into the production system and the need to take a shared responsibility for their quality, instead of treating them as outsiders and antagonists.”   This is a big issue that is not relegated to China, but is a prevalent attitude of buyers who refer to “the factory” as if it were an inanimate object. 

When this stops is when the factory produces something whose quality is undeniable and unimpeachable and where they don’t compromise anything for an order. 

Deming continues to be studied because his system is logical and it works. Those who never heard of Deming and heard the words “Statistical Quality Control” and “Total Quality Management” without knowledge of Deming himself and his principles will mistake it for a statistics-dependent methodology; that would be very wrong. Yes, Deming believed that statistics play and important role in Quality and Improvement management, but he by no means was a blind follower of numbers; conversely, he emphasized that “the control chart is no substitute for the brain”  and that "The best protection is afforded by acceptance sampling

done in conjunction with quality control at the manufacturing plant. It is not economical to try to get a good product by inspecting a lot and taking up only the best ones." 

I was lucky enough to have Deming as a professor for a course at NYU Stern in the mid-1970’s. While I now regret not absorbing more of what he said, it is clear to me that the striking aspect of his teaching and his message is that you didn’t really need to take notes because it all made such common sense.

The result of Japanese manufacturers absorbing and incorporating Deming’s lessons is history. Today, rather than representing cheap product, Japanese products justifiably compete for the title of “world’s best” in many areas. Material and manufactured product are unquestionably superior, and command a superior price. Customers pay for quality, which builds value, and are passionately loyal to brands that provide it for them. I could make a list from my own experience, but I believe you know what I mean..

Is that the case for China? Should it be? Can it ever be? If it should and can, what changes need to be made for it to be successful?

(Questions to be answered in next part)

中国纺织服装业2023年：派对结束了，中国需要邀请一个戴明来参加下一个派对 莲花与迈克尔的观点2023年：四个部分的改变者

中国纺织服装业2023年：派对结束了，中国需要邀请一个戴明来参加下一个派对

莲花与迈克尔的观点2023年：四个部分的改变者

（另附的文章已翻译成简体中文）

I. 2023年中国纺织/服装出口商的情况以及原因。中国目前的纺织和服装情况如何？

II. 谁是W. Edwards Deming，他在1950年告诉了日本人什么？

III. 为了重建中国的声誉、尊重和业务，需要做出哪些改变？

IV. 如果不这样做，中国纺织和服装业会像美国汽车业一样面临清算吗？

文章摘要：中国的纺织和服装业正面临严重困境。以下一些或全部因素可能负有责任：1. 政治关系和持续的关税；2. 中国以廉价和劣质产品的声誉，这在一定程度上是有事实依据的；3. 中国国内需求低迷，受到封锁和经济疲软的影响；4. 由于上述一些或全部原因，大量资源转向越南等其他国家。

在本文中，我们建议中国唯一的长期解决方案是重建其优质产品和时尚创新的声誉，就像日本在20世纪50年代使用W. Edwards Deming的教导所做的那样。除此之外，中国工厂需要建立自己的品牌，既不是“廉价”品牌，也能与其他国际品牌在款式和质量上媲美。

但是，中国工厂的所有者对改变持抵制态度，开始恐慌，并且除了寻找可能为他们销售产品的人之外，他们对任何解决方案都感到迷茫。但是，他们能销售的又是什么，除了“廉价中国”？

最后，我们预测，如果一些工厂不引领中国朝着新的方向发展，中国的纺织业将会崩溃或者被降级为如TJ Maxx和沃尔玛等大众市场的销售对象。这部分原因是由于美国零售经济的分化和整合：中档百货商店正在消失，只剩下与大众市场以极低价格竞争或高端和奢侈品牌在直销渠道或者Net-A-Porter和FarFetch等平台销售。此外，几乎每天都会出现许多新的创新品牌。中国在线销售平台的替代选择只有SHEIN和TEMU，这两者都是以廉价和劣质为特点，而创新的中国品牌很少被海外客户看到。

中国纺织业将不得不面临一个清算，就像美国汽车业在20世纪70年代和80年代所经历的那样（正如大卫·哈尔伯斯塔姆在他获得普利策奖的1986年著作中所描述的）：世界已经发生了变化，过去的做事方式和过去能够逃脱的事情已经不存在了。如果你不面对当今世界的现实，你也将消失无踪。

I. 2023年中国纺织/服装出口商的情况以及原因。中国目前的纺织和服装情况如何？

中国的纺织和服装业陷入了困境。自中国加入世贸组织并取消配额制度以来的20多年里，再也没有容纳更多的制造商与美国客户做生意并出口产品，并在此过程中获得财富（无论是相对的还是真实的）。这是一个农业经济，几乎一夜之间转变为全球强国，位居世界工厂的第一位。只要开个工厂，卖点东西（不必太好），你就会有很多客户。

在沃尔玛的带领下，他们从中国购买了70-80%的产品，大量廉价商品充斥在美国的商店和网站上。梅西百货等百货公司也跑去中国，参与到比价格更低的游戏中，而不是坚守中产阶级的本源。因此，似乎转眼间，每个人都想从中国购买东西（这里的“shit”是以质量为评判标准）。消费者们面对到处都是廉价商品的海洋时，他们将价值定位从价格决定价值转变为价值由价格决定。

让我们来看看数据，但需要事先说明：这些数据有误导性。

根据美国商务部报告，2021年的数据如下：

“2021年，中国仍然是美国纺织品进口的主要来源。2021年，美国从中国进口了503亿美元的纺织品，占美国纺织品进口总额的32.6%。”

还有2022年的数据：

“2022年，中国仍然是美国纺织品进口的主要来源。美国进口额从2021年的503亿美元增长了6.7%（34亿美元），达到537亿美元，占美国纺织品进口总额的29.7%。”

看起来一切都好，对吧？但我们发现了几个问题：1. 2022年是非疫情年，进口额应该增加（2018年为5380亿美元，因此总体上才刚刚达到疫情前的水平）；2. 如果中国在2022年保持了相同的美国进口额，那么它本应多做11亿美元的生意；3. 根据给出的数据，美国对这些商品的进口额从2021年增长了18.2%，所以中国的增长确实是占比较小的一部分；4. 这些数据反映的是2022年实际收到的货物，因此根据4-6个月的计划周期，很大一部分商品是在2021年订购的。

无论如何看待这些数据，尽管进口额有所增加，但从2021年到2022年，中国纺织和服装进口明显减少。在2022年收到的订单并在2023年交付的情况下，进口量将进一步减少。

更糟糕的是，很明显中国的工厂正在牺牲价格和利润，只是为了发货。看一下这个数据：

中国的服装进口量占了35%，但只有22.2%的价值。另一方面，越南的进口量占15.9%，但价值却占了18.4%。这对你来说意味着什么？廉价中国正在变得更便宜，而越南则在要求更高的价格。

现在，我们应该对中国纺织和服装行业的情况有了一定了解，以及为什么中国制造商感到迷失和绝望。情况只会变得更糟。

所以，如果你是中国制造商，你会问自己：“我该怎么办？”很明显，这里适用于“疯狂定义是做同样的事情两次，却期望不同的结果”。中国和中国的经济需要不同的结果。纺织和服装所占中国进口的10%，如果有所减少，将对经济和就业产生重大影响。我们可以肯定的是，基于该行业（不仅仅是中国）已经确立的模式，工人将承受减少的冲击，而所有者并不会从自己的银行账户中拿出任何东西。

最后，中国经济增长疲软和不稳定对世界经济产生重大影响。

本文中我们提到了W. Edwards Deming，一个20世纪50年代的美国统计学家和质量控制专家，对日本工业的发展产生了重大影响。在接下来的部分中，我们将探讨他在日本所做的事情，以及中国是否能够借鉴他的经验来重建纺织和服装业。

China textile and apparel 2023: The Party’s Over and China needs to invite a Deming to the next party Lotus & Michael Perspective 5-2023: A Game Changer in four parts

This is part 1 of 4 parts, as outlined below. Each subsequent part will be released separately at a later date. IF you wish to inquire about the next release, email mserwetz@gmail.com

(The article under separate cover is translated into Simplified Chinese) Link to Chinese Translation

I. The situation for Chinese textile/apparel exporters in 2023 and why it is what it is. What is the current textile and apparel situation in China?

II. Who is W. Edwards Deming and what did he tell the Japanese in 1950?

III. What needs to change in China to rebuild China’s reputation, respect and business?

IV. If not, will there be a Reckoning for China textile and apparel like there was for the US Auto Industry?

Article Abstract: Textile and Apparel business in China is suffering badly. Some or all of the following factors can be held responsible: 1. Political relations and the continuing Tariffs; 2. China’s reputation for cheap and poor quality product which is, at least partially, justified by evidence; 3. Sluggish domestic demand due to the lockdown and poor economy in China; 4. Due to some or all of the above, significant resourcing to alternative countries such as Vietnam.

In this article, we suggest that the only long-term solution for China is to rebuild its reputation for quality product and fashion innovation, just as Japan did in the 1950’s using the lessons of W. Edwards Deming’s teachings as a platform. Combined with this, China factories need to build their own brands which a. don’t scream Cheap and b. stand up to other international brands in style and quality.

But, China factory owners are resisting change, starting to panic and are lost for any solution except to find someone who may sell their product for commission. But, what would they be selling other than “Cheap China?”

Finally, we predict that, if some factories don’t lead the way to a new direction for China, the Chinese textile industry will crash and burn or, at best, be relegated to the mass market in such outlets as TJ Maxx and Walmart. Part of this is due to the bifurcation and consolidation of the US retail economy: The middle level department store base is disappearing, leaving only either competition for the mass market at rock-bottom prices or premium and luxury brands sold DTC or on platforms like Net-A-Porter and FarFetch. In addition, many new and innovative brands are appearing almost daily. The only Chinese online alternatives to those platforms are SHEIN and TEMU, which are by nature cheap and poor quality, and the innovative Chinese brands are rarely seen by overseas customers.

The Chinese textile industry will have to have a Reckoning, just as the American auto industry did in the 1970s and 1980s (as described by David Halberstam in his Pulitzer Prize-winning 1986 book): The world has changed; the way you did things and the things you got away with in the past are gone. If you don’t face the reality of the world today, you will also be gone.

I. The situation for Chinese textile/apparel exporters in 2023 and why it is what it is. What is the current textile and apparel situation in China?

The China textile and apparel business is in trouble. After more than 20 years, since China was admitted into the WTO and quotas were abolished, there isn’t room for one more manufacturer to do business with US customers and export their product, getting rich (comparatively or really) in the process. Here is a peasant economy that was transformed almost overnight into a global powerhouse, ascending to the #1 position as the world’s factory. Just open a factory, sell something (it doesn’t have to be great), and you will have lots of customers. 

Led by Walmart, who buys 70-80% of their product from China, immense volumes of cheap goods filled American stores and sold on websites. Department stores like Macy’s ran to China to get into the cheaper-than-thou game, rather than stick to their middle-class roots. So, in what seemed like the blink of an eye, everybody wanted to buy shit from China (that word used qualitatively). What happened on the consumer side was, confronted by a sea of cheap shit everywhere, the average consumer (not just the struggling ones who needed to buy cheap) flipped their value proposition from price is determined by value to value is determined by price.

Let’s look at the numbers, which we will say up front are deceiving:

For 2021, according to the US Department of Commerce report:

“In 2021, China remained the major source of U.S. imports of Textile Products. In 2021, U.S. imports of $50.3 billion of Textile Products from China constituted 32.6% of the total U.S. imports of Textile products.” 

And 2022:

“In 2022, China remained a major source of U.S. imports of Textile Products. U.S. imports increased by 6.7% ($3.4 billion) from $50.3 billion in 2021 to $53.7 billion, constituting 29.7% of the total U.S. imports of those commodities.” 

All good, right? We see several issues: 1. 2022 was the first non-pandemic year so it stands to reason imports should go up (they were $538 billion in 2018 so overall they were just reaching pre-pandemic levels; 2. Had China had the same piece of US imports in 2022, it would have had $1.1 billion more business; 3. Based on the numbers given, US imports of those commodities increased 18.2 percent from 2021 to 2022, so China’s increase was indeed a smaller piece of the pie; 4. These numbers reflect what was received in 2022, so based on the planning cycle of 4-6 months, much of the goods were ordered in 2021.

Any way you look at it, despite the increase, there is a clear erosion of textile and apparel imports from 2021 to 2022. Orders received in 2022 and delivered in 2023 will show a further erosion. 

Here’s the worst part: Clearly China factories are shipping goods just to ship goods and are sacrificing price and profit. Take a look at this:

 

 Apparel Imports from China were 35% of the quantity but only 22.2% of the value. On the other hand, imports from Vietnam were 15.9% of the quantity and 18.4% of the value. What does that mean to you? Cheap China  is getting cheaper while Vietnam is commanding higher prices.

Now, we should have an idea of what is happening in the textile and apparel sector from China and why Chinese manufacturers feel lost and desperate. This will only get worse.

So the question if you are Chinese manufacturer is (or should be), “What should I do?” It is clear that the definition of insanity applies here: trying to do something the same way twice and expecting different results. China and China’s economy needs different results, especially in the textile and apparel industry. The 10% of imports from China that apparel and textile represents cannot erode without significant effect on the economy and employment. We can guarantee that, based on clearly established patterns of the industry (not just in China) that the workers will bear the brunt of any reduction; the owners are not giving back anything from their bank accounts.

Finally, weak economic growth and disruption in China has a significant effect on the world economy.

The rest of this article will build a case for a sea change in China’s apparel and textile industry, the same sea change that Japan made to transform the tagline of “Made in Japan” from cheap to one of the world’s best. 

Those who read this and know China will wonder whether the culture and experience since Deng Xiao Ping declared that some people should get rich first is so embedded at this point that it minimizes or eliminates the possibility of positive change. We believe it can happen, led by the younger generation, the sons and daughters of the people who got rich first and the easy way. But it won’t happen until the older generation steps aside AND the government lets it happen.

Next, we take a look at what happened starting in 1950 Japan, led by W. Edwards Deming, which led to Japan’s current position on the world’s quality product scale. THIS is the example China should follow.